Judicial Restraintt

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

Judges, like other thoughtful Americans, love mystery. Justice
Rehnquist began his dissenting opinion in a case presenting a rather
technical question of statutory construction by observing that the
"effort to determine congressional intent here might better be en-

trusted to a detective than to a judge."' He drew an inference from
the silence of Congress that paralleled the reasoning of Sherlock

Holmes who had recognized the significance of a watchdog's silence
when a critical event occurred in its presence.2 The skillful author of

a mystery story may provide us with a handful of clues in his first
chapter, but then require us to consider a variety of alternative solu-

tions while the story unfolds before we realize just why the dog
failed to bark.

The Constitution of the United States is a mysterious document.
The wisdom that created the Constitution is evidenced not only by

the handful of clues that are set forth in its text, but also by what
the document does not say. The text does not expressly tell us why so

many questions are left unanswered - why the power to answer
them was delegated to future generations of lawmakers - or even
t Address by Justice Stevens, The Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture
Series at The University of San Diego School of Law, San Diego, California (October
10, 1984).
1. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 595 (1980).
2. See id. at 596, 602. In his account of the "Silver Blaze" Holmes had
explained:
Before deciding that question I grasped the significance of the silence of the
dog, for one true inference invariably suggests others. The Simpson incident had
shown me that a dog was kept in the 'stables, and yet, though someone had been
in and had fetched out a horse, he had not barked enough to arouse the two lads
in the loft. Obviously the midnight visitor was someone whom the dog knew
well.
A. DOYLE, THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 349 (1905).
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how some rather obvious questions should be resolved.
Article II vests executive power in the President, and expressly
authorizes him to appoint various officials. It provides that:
[Hie shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges

of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 3

Curiously, although the President's power of appointment is thus
carefully defined, except for the guarantees of life tenure for judges
and the description of the impeachment process, the constitutional
text does not mention the power of removal. Specifically, it does not
tell us whether an officer appointed by the President with the consent
of the Senate may be removed by the President without such
consent.
That question has been debated more than once. In 1789, when
Congress enacted legislation creating the Department of Foreign Affairs, it apparently concluded that the President did have the power
of removal, at least in the absence of legislation purporting to constrain that power.4 In 1867, when it enacted the Tenure of Office
Act, Congress decided that officers appointed with the consent of the
Senate should not be removed without such consent.5 The confrontation between Congress and President Johnson over that Act was the
subject of impeachment proceedings; nevertheless, it was not until
1926 that the Supreme Court squarely addressed the question - as
it is framed in the first sentence of Chief Justice Taft's opinion in the
Myers case - "whether under the Constitution the President has
the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United
States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate." 6 The extended opinion by the Chief Justice concluded
by first noting that the Court had "studiously avoided deciding the
issue until it was presented in such a way that it could not be
avoided," and then holding
that the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent
the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by
him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that
subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so. 7

The Myers case, however, did not by any means provide us with
the last chapter in the story of the President's power of removal.
3. U.S. CONsT. art. HI.
4. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 111-15 (1926).
5. See id. at 166.
6. Id. at 106.
7. Id. at 176.
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Less than a decade later, in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,8
the Court unanimously held that President Roosevelt's removal of a
member of the Federal Trade Commission was invalid because his
action did not comply with the governing statute. At the end of an
opinion that described the so-called "quasi-legislative" and "quasijudicial" powers of the commission, the Court wrote:
To the extent that, between the decision in the Myers case, which sustains the unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely executive
officers, and our present decision that such power does not extend to an
office such as that here involved, there shall remain a field of doubt, we
within it for future consideration and determileave such cases as may fall
nation as they may arise.0

The "field of doubt" described by Justice Sutherland provided fertile ground for discussion in the constitutional law class taught by
Professor Nathaniel L. Nathanson at the Northwestern University
School of Law in 1945. Like other students in that class, I felt that I
could often tell whether a case had been decided correctly or incorrectly by reference to certain fundamental propositions. I placed special confidence in these: "Ours is a government of laws, not men."
"The Constitution created a government in which three kinds of
power - Legislative, Executive, and Judicial - are to be exercised
by three separate branches - the Congress, the President, and the
Judiciary." On a somewhat more sophisticated level, I knew that a
case decided in the 1920's - a period that was perceived by freshman law students in the 1940's as only slightly less remote than the
dark ages - was wrongly decided if Justice Holmes and Justice
Brandeis dissented - as they had in the Myers case - whereas a
case decided in the 1930's was surely correct if those two jurists
joined the opinion - as they had in-the case of Humphrey's Executor. The use of Justice Brandeis' position as a litmus test seemed
particularly safe because we knew that Professor Nathanson "Nate" as his students affectionately referred to him in their private
conversations - had served as a law clerk to the great Justice and
therefore could be counted on to align himself with his mentor's
views.
The questions that were raised during our class discussion of these
two cases were not nearly as easy, or as predictable, as we had anticipated. Surprisingly, the Professor's questions treated the rationale of
Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion and the rationale of Justice
8. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
9. Id. at 632.

Brandeis' dissent with equal respect. His questions implied that we
should understand both arguments before deciding to prefer one over
the other. They also implied that there might be a difference of constitutional significance between the power of appointment and the
power of removal, and also between the latter power and the power
to suspend an employee, and, of course, that the Legislature's power
to place conditions on the Executive's power of removal might depend on whether the condition was a flat legislative veto or merely
the formulation of a governing standard. But then one could not be
confident that any of these distinctions really mattered because the
unanimous opinion in Humphrey's Executor had relied on the overriding distinction between an office that was purely executive in
character and one that could be characterized as "quasi-legislative"
or "quasi-judicial." The description of such hybrids in the Court's
opinion had, of course, had a somewhat unsettling effect upon the
freshman law student's original understanding of the basic doctrine
of separation of powers, but even more unsettling was the Professor's
line of questioning that seemed to undermine the Court's implicit
assumption that an executive officer such as the postmaster general
does not exercise any rulemaking or adjudicatory authority. Was
such an officer performing a purely executive task when he decided
whether a postcard was too obscene to be mailable?
After a number of class sessions it eventually began to dawn on
the students that we were not merely talking about the Executive's
power of removal, or about the Legislature's power to attach conditions to that power, but rather about the whole doctrine of separation of powers. The omission from the text of the Constitution of any
reference to the power of removal suddenly seemed insignificant
compared to the omission of any categorical description of the principles that either prohibited or delimited the exercise of Legislative,
Executive, or Judicial power by a particular branch of the Government. When we began to feel that we had at long last perceived the
underlying issue that our Professor was raising with us, we assumed
that he would begin to provide us with some of the answers that we
could use when the time of real decision - final examination arrived. For we knew that our Socratic dialogue had been led by a
truly great mind, a man who was helping us to get an understanding
of our basic law with the complete impartiality and intellectual honesty of the pure scholar, and one whose experience and training had
given him a peculiar ability to answer questions about the meaning
of the Constitution.
Categorical answers, however, were not forthcoming. Instead, Nat
-

as I later came to know him -

surprised us by introducing new

material that we considered outside the record that we had been required to study. He called our attention to the arguments that had
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been raised in the briefs in the Humphrey case concerning the difference between the critical statutory language in the two cases and left
us with the question why the Court had chosen to base its decision
on a rationale that ignored the statutory points. Instead of answers,
we had been given not merely another question, but a whole new line
of inquiry to be used in seeking an understanding of a Supreme
Court opinion.
One reason I have dwelt on the discussion of these two cases is to
suggest why Nat's constitutional law class came to be known as
"Nate's Mystery Hour." A more important reason is to provide you
with a background for understanding a few sentences that he wrote
more than thirty years after I studied under him. In a talk that he
gave to a Northwestern alumni faculty luncheon in 1976 - which
he appropriately titled "The Mystery of Teaching Law" - he explained that one who is engaged in "teaching for the long pull" endeavors to impart some understanding of "the basic themes that appear again and again in different guises over the years." He referred
to his faith "that such understanding will provide our students with a
firm foundation for grappling with problems that none of us can
foresee, except in their most elemental and perhaps abstruse terms,
separated from the contemporary garb of the future which will give
them a new vitality and significance." According to Nat, the law
teacher's function
is to some extent a negative one: we are the sworn enemies of the glittering
half-truths, the oversimplified explanations. We are constantly at war with
our own offspring, the black-letter law, the restatements, the hornbooks,
and their latest West Publishing Company incarnation, which purport to
give the basic law of each subject "in a nutshell." '

Professor Nathanson's refusal to unravel the mystery of the Myers
case with a succinct statement of a black-letter rule defining the
scope of the President's power of removal is not entirely explained by
his teaching philosophy. It also rested, in part, on his conviction that
it is often wise to avoid answering profound questions of constitu10. Nathanson, The Mystery of Teaching Law, Nw. REP., Winter 1977, at 9. It is
interesting to compare these comments with Professor Nathanson's earlier description of
his professor's respect for the doctrine of judicial restraint:
This cautious refusal to go a step beyond the necessities of the issue presented
may try the patience of those anxious for guiding principles to control the course
of future proceedings. For those more impressed with the proclivity of ambitious
dicta to mislead rather than illuminate, the Justice's rigorous restraint may have
much to recommend it.
Nathanson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Administrative Law, 67 YALE L.J. 240, 249
(1957).

tional law for as long as possible. This, of course, is the accepted
doctrine, as Chief Justice Taft had noted in his Myers opinion. It
increases the likelihood that the answer, when given, will be fully
informed, and tends to minimize the risk of error associated with
premature decision. But in an article about the separation of powers
doctrine that he penned in 1981, Professor Nathanson made a quite
different point concerning the desirability of postponing the decision
of constitutional questions. He suggested that positive benefits may
be associated with indecision and uncertainty in some contexts. The
suggestion is made at the end of an article which actually provides
us with some of Nat's answers to the questions presented by the My-

ers and Humphrey's cases and which explains the basis for his opinion that the legislative veto was constitutional. The concluding
sentences of that article merit quotation in full:
I would not want my support of the constitutional validity of the congressional veto to be interpreted as support for its political wisdom or its administrative practicality. On the whole, it seems to me that the experience with
the congressional veto demonstrates its undesirability except in very limited
circumstances. Somewhat paradoxically, I am also inclined to doubt the desirability of a judicial resolution of this vexing question. Even though I disagree with the President's legal position on the congressional veto, I would
not like to see it irrevocably decided against him.1

At this point, Professor Nathanson noted that former Attorney General Levi had expressed a different opinion on the merits of the constitutional issue but had also suggested that judicial resolution of the
question might nevertheless be undesirable.12 Nat then concluded:
[I]n some areas of government consistency, like certainty, is not the greatest desideratum. In my view, this is one of those areas. The use of the congressional veto should not be encouraged, but neither should it be constitutionally outlawed. The President should be left free to insist upon his view
of constitutionality and the Congress upon its view. If both are reasonably
uncertain of success, perhaps neither will be apt to push for final resolution.

11. Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the
Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064, 1110 (1981).
12. Professor Nathanson expressed his agreement with the following comment by
former Attorney General Levi:
Resolution of such disputes provides a kind of certainty. But this is an area of
great difficulty, requiring caution. There is no doubt that judicial intervention is
sometimes essential. However, the danger in attempting to provide final answers
is not only that the courts will inevitably alter the balance between Congress
and the Executive in the context of a particular situation, but also that the very
nature of this kind of determination, when the interactions of a government of
checks and balances are involved, may then require continuing judicial supervision. This would constitute a removal to the courts of judgments of responsibility
and discretion, and would significantly alter the balance between the courts and
the other branches. The consequence may well be to weaken rather than
strengthen accountability. We are sometimes said to be a litigious people, but
the Constitution, while it establishes a rule of law, was not intended to create a
government by litigation. A government by representation through different
branches, and with interaction and discussion, would be much nearer the mark.
Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 371, 387 (1976).
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In terms of the particular controversies now pending, it seems hardly thinkable that Congress would risk the constitutionality of the veto as a whole
upon the provision of the Education Act regulations now in dispute. Conversely, it seems highly unlikely that the Federal Trade Commission would
dare to ignore a concurrent resolution of the Congress disapproving one of
its regulations. If neither Congress nor the President were inclined to litigate the constitutional question, it is also possible that the Court might continue to find ways to avoid deciding the issue even if it were pressed by
private parties. To my mind, this would, for the foreseeable future, be the
happiest solution.13

The fields in which the powers of the three Branches of Government overlap are not the only areas in which neither consistency nor

certainty is the greatest desideratum. Nor are they the only areas in
which the process of constitutional adjudication may be well served

by a policy of procrastination and indecision. Another such area encompasses the troublesome issues raised by the kind of affirmative

action program that was adopted by the University of California

Medical School and challenged in the Bakke case.14 Although this

point is not expressly made in an article that Professor Nathanson
co-authored for the Chicago Bar Record in 1977 before the Supreme
Court decided the Bakke case, his concluding paragraph is implicitly
concerned with the impact of the passage of time on the process of

constitutional adjudication. Because that paragraph will serve to remind us of both the difficulty and the importance of the constitu-

tional issues, I shall read it to you:
For a great many reasons, it would be unwise to abandon strict judicial
scrutiny of racial classifications. Quotas and ratios can be used as easily to
exclude minorities as to admit them. Minority preferences may serve a
compelling interest in today's society, but it does not follow that they should
be institutionalized as a normal part of the American social scene. As emergency measures, they are temporary expedients, designed as a response to
the traumatic experiences of the 1960's and the warnings of the Kerner
Commission report. The sooner their objectives of integration and racial
equality are achieved, the more quickly can racial preferences be dispensed
with in education and employment. As the opinion in Shelly v. Kraemer
wisely observed: "Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." It would be a sad day indeed, were
America to become a quota-ridden society, with each identifiable minority
assigned proportional representation in every desirable walk of life. But this
is not the rationale for programs of preferential treatment; the acid test of
their justification will be their efficacy in eliminating the need for any racial
or ethnic preference at all. At most, they are entitled to a reasonable trial
period. If they serve their purposes well enough, they should disappear of
their own accord. If they fail, they should be abandoned in favor of other
13. Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, The
Legislative Veto, and The "'Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064, 1111
(1981).
14. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

alternatives. But no court is in a position to make this ultimate determina-

tion now, and it will be years before sufficient data are available to enable a
court to form a reasoned judgment. Until that time comes, preferential
treatment should receive a carefully qualified judicial approval, accompanied by clear notice that it may subsequently be withdrawn, either because
the programs have substantially served their purpose or because they have
been fairly tried and found antmg.

When Nat wrote that paragraph, and when I first read it, it was
generally assumed that the Bakke case presented only a constitutional issue. The briefing of the case in the Supreme Court, however,
made it apparent that it was possible that the decision of the California Supreme Court might be affirmed on a statutory ground that
would have obviated the need to address the constitutional issue. I do
not propose to reargue the merits of the statutory issue, but I think it
may be useful, with the benefit of hindsight, to consider whether the
orderly development of the law might have been better served if the
statutory issue had been decisive. In reflecting about that question
one must not forget that while the case was pending there was a
great public interest in receiving a definitive and clear cut answer to
the constitutional question from the Court as promptly as possible.
Indeed, both parties to the litigation asked the Court to determine
the legality of the University's special admissions program on constitutional grounds.
The relevant statutory language, Section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.1"

The record established that the University, through its special admissions policy, had excluded Bakke from participation in its program of medical education because of his race. The University had
also acknowledged that it was receiving federal financial assistance.
Believing that the statute contained a straightforward prohibition
against discrimination on account of race, four Members of the
Court concluded that their duty to affirm was clear.
The majority, however, was persuaded that Congress had intended
to enact a narrower prohibition - one that was coextensive with the
coverage of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 17 Thus, to the extent that there might have been uncertainty
15. Nathanson & Bartnik, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for
Minority Applicants to ProfessionalSchools, 58 CH. B, REc. 282, 292-93 (1977).
16. 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
17. In view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only

those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth
Amendment.
438 U.S. at 287 (Opinion of Powell, J.).
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in the meaning of the constitutional provision in 1954, Congress in
.effect delegated to the Judiciary the task of defining the precise contours of the statutory prohibition it was enacting. As a result of this
delegation, two extremely significant later interpretations of the constitutional provision - the holding in Washington v. Davis,"8 that
only intentional discrimination is prohibited by the equal protection
clause, and the implicit holding in Bakke itself that some measure of
affirmative action is constitutionally permissible - are now a part of
the statute even though it is arguable that in 1964 Congress could
not have anticipated either holding.
The majority's conclusion in Bakke that it had a duty to provide
guidance concerning the meaning of the Constitution has, of course,
created some uncertainty concerning the meaning of Tite VI, and
also, perhaps, of other federal statutes that were patterned after it.
The array of opinions in the Guardianscase 9 illustrates some of the
confusion that has been engendered by the narrow construction of
Title VI that confines its coverage to intentional discrimination. Perhaps, as judges like to suggest, that confusion should be attributed to
Congress for failing to express its meaning in plainer language. The
rejoinder from the Legislature, of course, would imply that closer
attention to the policy of judicial restraint might have avoided the
confusion entirely.
A determination that the University of California's quota system
violated Title VI would have had precisely the same impact on Alan
Bakke's medical career as the Court's actual disposition. The impact
of such a holding on affirmative action in educational programs receiving federal financial assistance would, however, presumably have
been significant enough to require Congress to consider some of the
policy questions that are raised by these programs. Congressional
consideration of the extent to which affirmative action has been, or
may become, successful in achieving the objective of full integration
and true racial equality would help us to understand whether these
programs should be characterized as temporary expedients or as
In sum, Congress' equating of Title VI's prohibition with the commands of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, its refusal precisely to define that racial
discrimination which it intended to prohibit, and its expectation that the statute
would be administered in a flexible manner, compel the conclusion that Congress intended the meaning of the statute's prohibition to evolve with the interpretation of the commands of the Constitution.
438 U.S. at 340 (Opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
18. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
19. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of New York, 103 S. Ct. 3221
(1983).

permanent institutions. Experience in other areas of constitutional
adjudication suggests that even though the basic themes that characterize the advantages and disadvantages of affirmative action can
readily be discerned, the contemporary garb in which these programs
will appear in the future may not be entirely clear and that further
study in a legislative forum, as well as elsewhere, would minimize
the risk of error associated with the ultimate judicial resolution of
the underlying constitutional questions.
Avoiding the constitutional issue in the Bakke case arguably
would itself have been nothing more than a temporary expedient.
But one cannot be sure how soon the constitutional issue would again
have been presented in a justiciable context. Moreover, no matter
how the issue might ultimately be decided, the passage of time might
soften the impact of the decision - either because of the gains in
minority participation in our professions that are achieved while the
debate is carried on, or because the opponents of these programs
might be more willing to accept them as a fair solution to a serious
problem.
The actual disposition of the constitutional question presented in
the Bakke case has been criticized because there was no single opinion for the Court, because it is arguable that there is some internal
inconsistency in the prevailing opinion, and because it cannot be confidently asserted that all constitutional doubts concerning affirmative
action programs have been finally put to rest. Two points, however,
must be remembered: First, that the author of the prevailing opinion
is an exceptionally wise judge; and second, that an "intuition more
subtle than any articulate major premise" may have persuaded him
that a measure of uncertainty and inconsistency was an essential
characteristic of the disposition of the case that would best serve the
national interest at the time it was decided.
The doctrine of judicial restraint concerns the substance as well as
the timing of judicial decisions. It is, of course, axiomatic that the
judge is obligated to apply the law as he understands it to be rather
than as he thinks it ought to be. I believe that every judge with
whom I have served has conscientiously endeavored to perform that
obligation. Judges often differ, however, not only with respect to the
merits of particular issues, but also with respect to the number or the
scope of the issues that should be decided in a particular case. It is
this latter aspect of the decisional process to which the doctrine of
judicial restraint has special relevance.
The doctrine teaches judges to focus their attention on the issue
that must be addressed in order to decide the case or controversy
between the specific litigants before the Court. There seems to be
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growing support in the professional literature,

of capable

judges,2 1

0

and in the practice

for undertaking what Judge Harry Edwards has

described as "wide-angle decisionmaking" in appropriate cases.2 2

That type of decisionmaking may be considered desirable because it
provides needed guidance to lower courts and gives appellate courts

an opportunity for thorough clarification of existing case law. Stated
in somewhat different terms, it provides them with the opportunity to
state controlling propositions of law in large black letters and to formulate the glittering generalities that law students can memorize
and computers can readily store in their data banks.
We must, however, always be conscious of the danger that the
20. See, e.g., Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections
on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 414
(1983-84). See also a student comment on the Court's decision in Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980), which agrees with the Court's disposition of the question presented
by the case, but finds the opinion "seriously flawed" because it did not pass on three
other questions that the author considers both important and interesting. The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L.oREv. 75, 178-79 (1980).
21. See the cases cited in my opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment in Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984).
22. It is important to note that Judge Edwards' proposed use of wide-angle adjudication was intended as a very limited exception to the general practice followed by appellate judges. He introduced the subject as follows:
One of the most sacred tenets of appellate decisionmaking in the United
States is that, in rendering an opinion, a court should reach only those issues
essential to the resolution of the case before it and should discuss those issues
only to the extent necessary to dispose of the matter. The principles on which
the foregoing injunction is founded are basically sound, even constitutionally
mandated. Federal courts may decide only "cases and controversies"; they lack
the power to issue wholly advisory opinions. The advantages to well-informed
decisionmaking gained by hearing the arguments of parties, each of whom has a
significant stake in a live controversy, properly prompts courts to decline to pass
upon disputes that have become moot or in which one of the disputants has only
a tenuous interest. And similar considerations make courts reluctant to reach
issues not briefed by the parties. The net result of these considerations is that we
have a tradition of focused adjudication in the United States.
For the most part, I am a strong disciple of focused adjudication and see no
good reasons to challenge its traditional application. Nevertheless, there is a
highly naive and mythical quality to any suggestion that focused adjudication is
or should be the sole method of appellate decisionmaking. It should, I believe, be
the predominant method; however, in certain narrow categories of cases, this
presumed tradition should give way to what I call "wide-angle adjudication."
Before proceeding with my thesis, I should stress that what I have to say does
not reflect a novel idea. Indeed, I believe that appellate judges, for many years
now, have indulged a practice of wide-angle adjudication on appropriate occasions, while simultaneously proclaiming the inviolate virtues of focused adjudication. My mission in this part of the article, therefore, will be to rationalize and
justify an existing form of appellate decisionmaking that I find perfectly appropriate in certain limited circumstances.
Edwards, supra note 20, at 410-11.

glittering generality will turn out to be an overstatement that fails to
anticipate the contemporary garb in which a basic theme will appear
in future cases. Such overstatements may mislead students, judges,
and even Presidents of the United States. As Nat has reminded us,
we should
Consider, for example, the experience of President Roosevelt relying on
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), in discharging the Chairman
of the Federal Trade Commission, only to be told in Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935), that the 'expressions . . . which
tend to sustain the government's contention . . . are beyond the point
in23
volved and, therefore, do not come within the rule of stare decisis.'

Let me further illustrate the point with a comment on the doctrine
of substantive due process. When the Court repudiated the line of
cases that is often identified with Lochner v. New York,24 it did so in
strong language that not only glittered but seemed to foreclose forever any suggestion that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment gave any power to federal judges to pass on the sub-

stance of the work product of state legislatures. 25 The passage of
time has taught us, however, to beware of any such oversimplified
explanation of the doctrine.
23. Nathanson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Administrative Law, 67 YALE L.J.
240, 249 n.44 (1957).
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. This Court beginning at least as early as 1934, when the Nebbia case was
decided, has steadily rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the
Adair-Coppage line of cases. In doing so, it has consciously returned closer and
closer to the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legislate
against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial
and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific
federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law.
Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949).
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought.
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like
cases-that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been discarded.
We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. As this Court stated in a unanimous opinion in
1941, "We are not concerned . . . with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of
the legislation." Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to "subject the State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Government and wholly
beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to secure." It is now settled that States "have power to legislate
against what was found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial
and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific
federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law."
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963).
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The unequivocal repudiation of the doctrine of substantive due
process as exemplified by the Court's decision in Lochner might have

left us with at least three quite different conceptions of the meaning
of the fourth amendment's prohibition against state action that de-

prives a person of his liberty without due process of law. First, the
Court might have concluded that the clause is merely a guarantee of

fair procedure and affords the citizen no substantive protection at
all. As Justice White correctly noted in his valuable dissent in
Moore v. East Cleveland,28 the Court has never gone quite that far.
Instead, "the Court regularly proceeds on the assumption that the

Due Process Clause has more than a procedural dimension.

27

Sec-

ond, the Court might have adopted Justice Black's opinion that while

the due process clause has substantive as well as procedural content,
its reach should not extend beyond the specific guarantee of liberty
set forth in the Bill of Rights. 28 The plurality opinion of Justice Powell, as well as the dissenting opinions of Justice Stewart, 29 and Justice White, 0 in the Moore case, all reject this categorical interpretation. A more opened-ended position was expressed by Justice Harlan
who described the liberty protected by the clause as "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes the freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints .

.

. and

which also recognizes what a reasonable and sensitive judgment
must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of
the state needs asserted to justify their abridgement."31 The fact that
26. 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977).
27. Id. at 543.
28. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
29. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 537.

30.

Id. at 544.

31. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (dissenting opinion). In his separate
opinion concurring in the judgment in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-500
(1965), Justice Harlan expressly rejected the position that "the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not touch this Connecticut statute unless the enactment
is found to violate some rights assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights."
He went on to explain:
In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the enactment violates basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325. For reasons stated at length
in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, supra, I believe that it does. While
the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its
own bottom.

Id.

Justice Harlan's view is the most liberal of the three alternatives that
I have identified does not, of course, imply that he had any sympathy
for the wide ranging scope of review undertaken by the majority of
the Court in the Lochner days. Quite the contrary. As Justice White,
who of course served with Justice Harlan for several years, stated:
[N]o one was more sensitive than Mr. Justice Harlan to any suggestion that
his approach to the Due Process Clause would lead to judges 'roaming at
large in the constitutional field.' Griswold v. Connecticut, supra at 502. No
one pr6ceeded with more caution than he did when the validity of state 3or2
federal legislation was challenged in the name of the Due Process Clause.

If, merely for the purpose of class discussion, we assume that there
are three broad conceptions of the due process clause - the purely
procedural view, the categorical view of Justice Black, and the relatively open-ended view of Justice Harlan - it may be instructive to
apply the freshman law student's litmus test in an effort to determine which of the three is the most legitimate. The first step in such
a process would be to ask how Justice Holmes had approached this
kind of problem.
If Justice Holmes had wanted to use a wide-angle approach to the
issue, he might well have explained in straightforward language that
the due process clause is merely a guarantee of fair procedure and
that it does not give federal judges any power to review the substance of a state's laws. Indeed, his Lochner dissent has sometimes
been thought to convey that message. But that is not what Justice
Holmes' opinion actually said. He wrote:
General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will de-

pend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise. But I think that the proposition just stated, if it is accepted, will carry
us far toward the end. Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that the
word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said

that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood

by the traditions of our people and our law. It does not need research to
show that no such sweeping condemnation can be passed upon the statute
33
before us.

Thus, his opinion actually rested on the narrow proposition that the
New York law was surely not irrational - a proposition that was
adequate to dispose of the case before him.
We cannot rest entirely on a Holmes opinion, however, because it
was Justice Brandeis for whom our Professor clerked. Indeed, it was
in the 1934 Term when Nat served his clerkship that Justice Brandeis wrote a Court opinion that is seldom cited but which provides
the kind of clue to his judicial philosophy that a person with the
genius of Sherlock Holmes can best unravel. Let me bring this lec32.
33.

Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (emphasis added).
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ture to a close by reading two paragraphs that Professor Nathanson
wrote about the case in his article on The Philosophy of Mr. Justice
Brandeis and Civil Liberties Today, and then adding a brief

postscript.
Consider, for example, Brandeis's opinion for the Court in Nashville,
Chatanooga and St. Louis Railway v. Walters, holding that the state supreme court had erred in refusing to consider as relevant to the due process
question proof of special facts designed to establish that it was arbitrary
and unreasonable to require a railroad to bear half the cost of constructing
an underpass required by the state. The special facts presented by the railroad to sustain this position were that the underpass was prescribed as part
of a national system of federal aid to highways for the furtherance of motor
vehicle traffic, much of which consisted of motor carriers in direct competition with the railroad; that the increase in such traffic would greatly decrease rail traffic and deplete the revenue of the railroad company; and that
the amount of taxes paid by the railroads of the state, part of which was
devoted to the upkeep of public highways used by motor carriers, was disproportionately higher than the amount paid by motor carriers. Surely if
the spectacle of a railroad being forced to contribute to the success of a
competing mode of transportation was sufficient to offend the Justice's sense
of injustice and so qualify for the protection of property under the due process clause, the same could be said for the liberty of married couples to
determine for themselves whether to practice birth control. Whether the
Justice would have followed the Court in its next step, in effect extending
the same freedom to unmarried persons, is a somewhat harder question.
There is evidence that in sexual morals the Justice was an archconservative,
but I think there is also reason to believe that he would have distinguished
constitutionally between moral questions involving only consenting adults
and those involving harm to third parties.
My principal point is that Brandeis would have been more comfortable
with the Harlan opinions in Poe v. Ullman and Griswold than with that of
Douglas in Griswold, because the Harlan approach was more consistent
with the law Brandeis helped to make when he joined the opinions for the
Court in Meyer v. Nebraska, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and when he
wrote the opinion in the Nashville case. It is also relevant that, in his procedural due process opinions, the Justice did not hesitate to accord a higher
degree of protection to personal rights as distinguished from property rights.
Finally, I believe that Brandeis would have had more intellectual respect for
Justice Harlan's willingness to admit and to struggle candidly with the elements of judgment involved in his approach than for the attempts of some
members 3 4of the Court to paper over those elements with a parade of
absolutes.

Let me now return to the point where I began -

the vast open

spaces in the text of that mysterious document, the Constitution of

the United States. The authors of that document implicitly delegated
35
the power to fill those spaces to future generations of lawmakers.

34. Nathanson, The Philosophy of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Civil Liberties Today, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 261, 284.

35. The framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left
to succeeding generations the task of applying that language to the unceasingly

Some of those decisions must be made by judges in the exercise
the power vested in them pursuant to Article III to decide cases
controversies. But just as the Framers themselves decided to say
more than was necessary to complete the task they had set out
perform, is it not fair to infer that their silence was a command
the judges of the future to exercise comparable self-restraint?

changing environment in which they would live. Those who framed, adopted,
and ratified the Civil War amendments to the Constitution likewise used what
have been aptly described as "majestic generalities" in composing the fourteenth
amendment. Merely because a particular activity may not have existed when the
Constitution was adopted, or because the framers could not have conceived of a
particular method of transacting affairs, cannot mean that general language in
the Constitution may not be applied to such a course of conduct. When the
framers of the Constitution have used general language, they have given latitude
to those who would later interpret the instrument to make that language applicable to cases that the framers might not have foreseen.
Rehnquist, The Notion of A Living Constitution, 54 Tax. L. REv. 693, 694 (1976).
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